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Abstract: We explore the performance of a potential addition to U.S. climate policy using authority under Section
115 of the Clean Air Act, with special attention to distributional effects among the states. This portion of the Act
concerns trans-boundary air pollution, and under its provisions a national greenhouse target could be allocated
among the states, with the details of state implementation optionally guided by a model rule as under other
provisions of the Act. With trading allowed among the states, such a measure could lead to a national price on
the covered gases. While we adopt features of a possible Section 115 implementation, the illustrative analysis is
applicable to similar cap-and-trade programs that might be adopted under other authorities. We investigate the
implications of such a policy using MIT’s U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model, with its electric sector
replaced by the Renewable Energy Development System (ReEDS) model developed by the U.S. National Renewable
Energy Laboratory. Existing federal and state climate policies are assumed to remain in place, and a national
constraint on CO2 emissions is applied to achieve 45% or 50% reductions below the 2005 level by 2030. We apply
the policies in a Baseline and a Low-Cost Baseline, the latter with more aggressive assumptions of technology cost
improvements. The U.S. is aggregated to 18 individual states and 12 multi-state regions, and the effects of the national
emissions restriction are investigated under three alternative methods by which the EPA might allocate these targets
among the states. We find the cost of achieving either target to be modest - allowing for nearly identical economic
growth, even without taking account of air quality and climate benefits. The alternative allocation methods generate
varying per capita revenue outcomes among states and regions and drive most of the welfare impact through a direct
income effect. It is assumed that states distribute permit revenue to their residents in equal lump-sum payments,
which leads to net benefits to lower income households. Under the Low-Cost Baseline, carbon prices in 2030 are
about ⅓ those in the Baseline, and the overall pre-benefit welfare effects are negligible. Considering climate benefits
evaluated using the social cost of carbon and particulate matter air pollution health benefits, less the mitigation costs,
we find net benefits in all cases, with slightly larger net benefits with the 50% reduction below 2005 emissions.
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1. A Potential U.S. National GHG
Emissions Policy
1.1 Action Under the Clean Air Act
To make its contribution to the Paris Agreement goal of
keeping global warming “well below” 2°C, the U.S. will
need to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions sharply over
the next few decades. Though states, cities and many in
the private sector are taking action on their emissions,
federal leadership is needed, preferably pursuant to new
comprehensive climate legislation. However, since 2009
when a comprehensive climate bill cleared the House but
failed in the Senate, the U.S. Congress has not seriously considered legislation that could achieve the needed
emissions reductions. Even with growing public support
for national action on climate, congressional passage of
comprehensive climate legislation also seems unlikely in
the near future. Fortunately, an alternative response is
available to meet the climate challenge: executive action,
including under the Clean Air Act (CAA).
Previously, the Obama Administration launched a Climate Action Plan whose centerpiece was action under the
CAA. It applied CAA Section 202(a), which grants the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to
regulate emissions from new motor vehicles, and Section
111, which does the same for new and existing stationary
sources (used to set standards for power plants, landfills, and
oil and gas operations). Though the resulting regulations
were subsequently weakened by the Trump Administration,
these CAA provisions are important tools for emissions
control. Yet they are also imperfect mechanisms for achieving ambitious, comprehensive GHG emissions control.
This sectoral approach makes key sources of emissions,
such as vehicles already on the road, difficult to address.
Also, the constraints within each section of the statute
(e.g., the directive to use the “Best System of Emissions
Reduction” under Section 111) could limit the potential
reductions. Further, the sector-by-sector approach not
only reduces the speed of reductions, by requiring multiple
time-consuming rulemakings, but can also miss potential
economic efficiencies by limiting the ability to seek the
lowest-cost emission reductions regardless of source or
location, and it opens up potential leakage to under- or
uncontrolled sectors.
One possible outcome of this sector-by-sector approach
under existing authority is a gap between what the sector-by-sector approach can achieve and the emissions
reductions needed to put the U.S. on track to meeting
the Administration’s long-term emissions goals or even
potential new emissions pledges under the Paris Agreement. For example, one prediction of baseline emissions in
2030 is that total U.S. GHG emissions might be 27% below
2005 levels. (Larsen et al., 2020). Conventional regulatory
2

policies could further reduce emissions. But because of
constraints on these measures, the failure to address all
emission sources, and the possibility of leakage and rebound
effects, reductions could fall short of the desired level.1
Seeking an approach to close any potential 2030 emissions
gap, we explore another policy tool provided in the CAA:
Section 115 which concerns international air pollution.
This provision of the Act offers a possible opportunity
to fill the gaps among state and federal policies, avoiding
limitations of actions under Sections 202(a) and 111, and
to do so in an efficient, flexible, and equitable fashion.
Potential designs for such a policy are investigated using
a simulation model of the U.S. economy, with particular
attention to the distribution of economic impacts among
the states, and among income groups within states.
1.2 Features of CAA Section 115
Section 115 (42 U.S. Code § 7415) on “International Air
Pollution” has been part of the Clean Air Act since 1965.
It is triggered when:
a)

EPA “. . . has reason to believe that any air pollutant
or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare
in a foreign country” (endangerment), and

b) that the other country “has given the U.S. essentially
the same rights with respect to the prevention or
control of air pollution occurring in that country
as is given that country” (reciprocity).
This provision of the CAA is potentially well suited for
application to climate policy considering the danger of
climate change to the U.S., the transboundary nature of
greenhouse gases, and the reciprocity provided by the Paris
Agreement, wherein all emitters have pledged emissions
reductions. When the two conditions above are met, EPA
must require each U.S. state to develop an implementation
plan through the same process used for implementing
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS),
which provides flexibility to adopt a range of tools (e.g.,
fees, permits, auctions) that can build upon existing efforts
in those states. Also, unlike sector specific EPA regulatory
authorities for climate, Section 115 allows the EPA to address
the totality of GHG emissions (Burger, 2020).
1
For an example, consider the avenues of leakage in a sector-by-sector regulatory approach that includes aggressive standards
for new light and heavy duty vehicles, an updated 111(d) standard for
the electricity sector, and updated energy efficiency standards. Higher
costs of new vehicles could create an incentive to keep old inefficient
vehicles in service longer, or a higher commercial electricity price
might encourage industry to self-generate power. Rebound effects can
involve people driving more or turning the thermostat higher because
with greater efficiency the fuel cost is lower.
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Section 115 would be implemented following the traditional
U.S. mode of cooperative federalism. In this framework, the
EPA sets national environmental targets, imposes constraints
or other conditions on the states, may promulgate a model
rule to help states design efficient and effective approaches,
and leaves it to each state to develop and carry out a State
Implementation Plan (SIP) suited to its particular circumstances. For climate in particular, states that already have
ambitious climate programs (e.g., California, New York,
Colorado) may find that their existing policies are largely
adequate to serve as the state implementation plan. Other
federal policies, such as vehicle standards under CAA Section
202, can assist states in meeting their individual obligations.
More specifically, under Section 115 the EPA could set a
target for total U.S greenhouse gas emissions and allocate
the required reductions to the states in some manner. The
SIP process would leave each state free to adopt its own
policies to meet its allocated share, including the ability to
trade allowances with other states. Consistent with other
recent policies, such as the Cross State Air Pollution Rule
(CSAPR), EPA could issue a model rule to provide states
with a uniform trading framework. While states would be
free to adopt other approaches to meet their goals, under
CSAPR 100% of states adopted the model rule and participated in a trading program. Each state would maintain
discretion about how to distribute the allowances, or revenue
from allowance auctions.
If we assume that all states would participate in national
trading, one result would be a national allowance price for
the covered emissions. Such a policy would, however, have
different effects among the states depending on how the
emissions reduction obligations were allocated and on the
structure of a state’s economy, particularly its energy sector.
The U.S. Supreme Court has offered deference to EPA in
determining how to distribute emission reduction obligations among the states. In its ruling on EPA vs. EME Homer
City, the Court laid out three approaches by which such an
allocation could be made (Barnett and Teitz, 2020). One
would allocate emissions to equalize marginal compliance
costs across the states (as EPA did in the Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule). A second would allocate in proportion
to a baseline emissions level, and a third would be on a
per capita basis. Other allocations, or combinations of
approaches are possible, but we use these three approaches
to illustrate how EPA’s allocation choices might be used to
balance regional considerations.

2. Analysis Method
We explore the implications of a potential national climate
policy under CAA Section 115 using a state/regional-level
model of the U.S. economy, augmented by a detailed model
of the electric sector. The effects of the three methods for
allocating emissions are considered under two potential na-

tional policy targets: a reduction in national CO2 emissions
of 45% and 50% below the 2005 level by 2030. These targets
span a range of near-term emissions reductions consistent
with a straight-line path to the 2050 net zero emissions
goal laid out by the Biden-Harris Administration. While
states have considerable flexibility under Section 115, to
facilitate our modeling we assume that states would elect to
implement Section 115 by participating in a market-based
allowance system.
2.1 The Combined USREP-ReEDS Model
The analysis employs an updated version of the U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model (Yuan et al., 2019),
with elaboration of its electric power sector by linkage
to the Renewable Energy Deployment System (ReEDS)
model developed by the U.S. National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (Brown et al., 2020). The two model components and their integration can be summarized as follows.
2.1.1 The USREP Component

Production sectors and households in USREP are modeled
with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production
and consumption functions, in some cases adding explicit
representation of new technologies such as electric vehicles.
Elasticities of substitution determine how producers and
consumers change their consumption of fuels and electricity in response to relative prices. An emissions cap under
Section 115 induces reductions in emissions by passing
carbon prices through fuel prices in proportion to the
carbon emitted by each fuel type, leading all sectors of the
economy and households to reduce fuel use to avoid this
extra cost. Any additional costs of producing goods are
further passed on through the price of the goods, offering
an additional incentive to reduce emissions.
To explore sub-national effects of Section 115 implementation, the version of USREP applied in the analysis distinguishes 30 U.S. regions, including 18 individual states
and 12 multi-state regions (Figure 1). To assess distributional effects of the policy, each region in USREP includes
representative households for each of nine income levels
(later aggregated to quintiles for graphical presentation).
Household income effects occur through several channels,
including changes in prices of goods and services, effects
on wages and capital returns, and by the way allowances,
or the revenue from allowance sales, are distributed. In
the results below, the distribution of allowance revenue
often dominates the other impacts on household income.
The economic data for the USREP model are from the
Minnesota IMPLAN group, and the physical flows of energy
are taken from the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s State
Energy Data System. The sources of data for these and other
aspects of the economy are listed in Table 1. (Details of the
electric sector are provided with the ReEDS component.)
3
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Figure 1. USREP Model, 30-Region Version
The U.S. is modeled as 18 individual states and 12 multi-state regions.
Table 1. Data Sources for the USREP Model

DATA AND PARAMETERS

SOURCE

Social Accounting Matrices

Minnesota IMPLAN Group (IMPLAN, 2008)

Physical Energy Flows and Energy Prices

Energy Information Administration - State Energy Data System (EIA-SEDS, 2009)

Fossil Fuel Reserves and Biomass Supply

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2009)
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 2009)
Dyni (2006)
Oakridge National Laboratories (ORNL, 2009)

Population Projection

U. of Virginia Demographics Research Group (UVA, 2018)

High-Resolution Wind Data

National Renewable Energy Laboratory - Wind Integration Datasets (NREL, 2010)

Non-CO2 GHG Inventories and
Endogenous Costing

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009)
Hyman et al. (2002)

Marginal Personal Income Tax Rates

NBER’s TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993)

Trade Elasticities

The GTAP 7 Data Base (Narayana and Walmsley, 2008) and own calculation

Energy Demand and Supply Elasticities

MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2014)

Passenger Vehicle Transportation

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA, 2005)
Davis and Boundy (2019)

2.1.2 The ReEDS Component

To more adequately capture the expected growing role of
renewables under climate policy, the USREP representation of the electric sector for the continental United States
is replaced by the ReEDS model developed by the U.S.
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). 2 ReEDS
considers 134 electricity balancing regions (Figure 2) and
associated bulk transmission. These balancing regions are
then further subdivided into 356 renewable-supply regions
to capture details of potential wind and solar resources.
2
For the non-continental US we retain the USREP representation of
the electricity sector, including multiple vintaged generation technologies
with a simpler supply curve representation of graded renewable resources.

4

The ReEDS model includes a comprehensive set of conventional generation sources as well as renewable technologies, and a range of storage options (Table 2). The
model captures variation in power supply and demand
over the load day and the course of the year by identifying 17 separate loads, comprised of four representative
diurnal time periods (morning, afternoon, evening and
night) for each season (winter, spring, summer, fall) and
a super peak which represents the highest 40 hours of load
in a year. This approach provides an ability to assess the
value of intermittent renewable resources, such as wind
and solar, taking account of the way further additions to
such supplies in particular regions will match seasonal
and weekly patterns of demand.
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Figure 2. Regional Structure of the ReEDS Model
The ReEDS model includes 134 balancing areas and distinguishes 356 regions of renewable supply.
Table 2. Electric Supply Technologies in the ReEDS Model

ReEDS TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTIONS
Traditional pulverized coal with and without SO2 scrubbers
Coal

Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) with or without CCS (Coal-CCS)
Co-fired coal with biomass

Conventional
Generating
Technologies

Combustion turbine (Gas-CT)
Natural Gas

Combined cycle (Gas-CC)
Combined cycle with carbon capture and sequestration (Gas-CCS)

Nuclear
Oil-Gas-Steam
Landfill Gas
Land-Based Wind
Offshore Wind

Renewable
Generating
Technologies

Solar Photovoltaics (PV)
Concentrating Solar Power (CSP)
Geothermal
Hydropower
Biopower
Marine Hydrokinetic Wave
Pumped hydropower storage (PHS)

Storage
Technologies

Batteries
Compressed air energy storage (CAES)
Thermal storage in buildings

5
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2.1.3 Inter-Model Linkage

An earlier version of the linked USREP-ReEDS model
is described in Rausch and Mowers (2012). The analysis
framework applied here follows that approach, linking the
two models using a decomposition algorithm that exploits
the block-diagonal structure of the Jacobian matrix of the
problem, initially demonstrated by Böhringer and Rutherford (2009). USREP represents electricity demand and fuel
demand outside the electricity sector, as well as fuel supply.
ReEDS represents electricity supply, fuel demand, capacity
investment, operating expenditure and inter-state trade for
the power sector. The solution algorithm iterates to clear
markets consistently in the two models. The markets for fuels
and electricity have the strongest links, but it is also crucial
to consistently clear capital and labor markets, and a market
for carbon allowances. The models are solved recursively on
a five-year time step to provide a quantitative description
of the evolution of the U.S. economy and its energy sector,
with and without potential Section 115 implementation.
2.2 Policy and Economic Assumptions
Emissions control measures under Section 115 would be implemented in the context of federal and state policies already
in place and economies affected by the Covid-19 pandemic
and gradual recovery from the recession. As summarized in
Table 3, the analysis baselines include the effects of emissions
control measures already in place or firmly committed, as

well as updated prospects for economic growth including
an approximation of the effects of COVID-19.
Our focus is on results through 2030. A regulatory program of this scope likely would be significantly updated
after five to ten years (or replaced with legislation), and
model uncertainties are too large to make quantitative
results useful for detailed policy design outside this time
window (Barron et al., 2018).
Creating baselines for the analysis is a 3-step process as
outlined in Table 3. First, we prepare a Reference projection
calibrated to historical data and EIA’s annual energy outlook.
Then, in a second step we adjust this Reference projection
for more recent developments (the pandemic, additional
state and regional policies) with technology cost and efficiency assumptions, including NREL’s 2019 Mid Range
technology cost assumptions, to create a Baseline. In Table
3 and discussion below this is referred to as the Mid Range
Baseline. In the third step we adjust this result to create
what we term a Low Cost Baseline by imposing a lower-cost
projection of electric sector costs from NREL and more
optimistic assumptions about other sectors. Policy scenarios
are developed and compared against these two baselines.
2.2.1 Reference Economic and Energy Projections

The base-year of the model is 2006, and simulated historical
state and regional economic activity is calibrated to more

Table 3. Reference, Baseline and Policy Scenarios

LABEL

SCENARIO DESCRIPTION

AEO
Reference

• Regional economic growth is calibrated to
BEA GSP for the historical years
• Future U.S. economic growth is calibrated to
AEO 2020 reference projection
• Regional electricity load grows at the same
rate as AEO 2020 electricity supply

• Uses NREL’s ATB 2019 Mid-Range Electricity technology
cost and performance assumption
• ReEDS reference case assumption on RPS, CES and wind/
solar carveout by state
• AEO 2020 CAFE standards for Light Duty Vehicles, with
LDV costs based on a review by Ghandi and Paltsev (2019).

Mid-Range
Baseline

• Electricity technology cost and performance
assumptions remain as in the Reference,
including NREL’s 2019 “Mid-Range” ATB cost
and performance assumptions
• COVID-19 pandemic effect implemented as
an impact on the labor force

• Regional abatement policies (AB32 Tax in CA*, emissions
cap in CO and NY)
• Policy updates in RPS/CES and wind/solar carveouts
• Updated RGGI cap with VA’s participation starting in 2025
• Government revenue neutrality is maintained through
personal income tax adjustment

Low-Cost
Baseline

• Uses NREL’s 2019 “Low” ATB cost and
performance assumptions
• Assumes 3% per year annual energy
efficiency improvement in all states/regions
similar to CA’s annual rate in recent decades.

• Assumes electric vehicle cost parity with ICE vehicle cost
after 2025. The ICCT (Lutsey and Nicholas, 2019) and
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2020) project parity by the
mid-2020’s.

Policy
Scenarios

• A national cap on fossil-fuel derived CO2 is set
relative to the 2005 emissions
• The national cap starts in 2025 with a 30%
reduction target, and achieves overall 45% or
50% reductions below the 2005 level by 2030
• Regional emissions control measures and
targets in the Baseline remain in place

• State shares of emissions reductions are generated based
on three allocation rules, Equal Per Capita (EPC), Equal
Marginal Cost (EMC), or Equal Cut from Baseyear (ECB)
• State allowance revenue derived from auctioning of
allowances is allocated on a per capita basis to each state’s
residents.

* The Agriculture and Other sectors are exempted from AB32’s cap and trade program. In order to better capture the impacts of
AB32 on power imports, the AB32 cap implemented in the AEO Reference case is replaced with a tax on the emissions.

6
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recent data for Gross State Product from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA, 2020). The Reference Scenario
of future economic activity is based on a projection of economic growth and energy use through 2030. Projected state
economic and electricity demand growth is calibrated so
that national GDP and electricity demand growth matches
that of the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual
Energy Outlook 2020 Reference Case (AEO, 2020). The
associated levels of gross product vary over time due to
differences among states in population growth, industry
mix and resource endowment. The ReEDS model includes
NREL’s Mid Range technology cost assumptions (NREL,
2019), and reference assumptions for state level Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS) and Clean Energy Standards
(CES), including various carve-outs for wind and solar
generation. Light-duty vehicle (LDV) costs are based on
a review by Ghandi and Paltsev (2019), and (consistent
with the AEO 2020) Obama-era CAFE standards for LDVs
are included.3
2.2.2 Economic and Energy Baselines

Starting with the Reference Scenario, we make adjustments
to reflect the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which occurred after the AEO estimate was made, and
newly adopted State policies. With estimates of the GDP
loss caused by the pandemic in 2020, and recovery in subsequent quarters, we project the path by which economies
may return to full employment over the longer term (Reilly,
Chen and Jacoby, 2021). The longer-term economic impact
of the pandemic will, of course, depend on the progress of
the virus and pace of vaccine development and use, and
on the fate of additional fiscal measures to promote recovery from the downturn. Thus, our estimate is a simplified
extrapolation of just one possible path of the pandemic’s
initial economic impact and recovery, and much uncertainty
remains. Still, given the significance of the pandemic, some
accounting for its effects on the economy, energy use and
emissions is necessary. Compared to the AEO Reference,
the COVID-only impact is a 2.2% reduction in GDP and
a 1.7% reduction in emissions in 2030.
Normally, calibration to the most recent EIA reference
(AEO, 2020), adjusted for pandemic effects, would provide
a good baseline from which to assess the implications of
an additional policy initiative. However, a number of states
have adopted new or additional policies aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions that are not reflected in the EIA
reference, so we incorporate other refinements that will
influence estimates of the economic effects of additional
3
LDV standards were significantly weakened as the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule by the Trump Administration, but are likely to be reinstated or tightened by the Biden
Administration. California continues to pursue the more aggressive
Obama-era stringencies.

measures. We approximate application of the AB32 cap
on emissions in California, and represent the mandatory
emissions goals adopted in Colorado and New York as
emissions caps implemented through market programs.
Assumed revenue from the state programs is retained within
the relevant state and allocated to state residents on a per
capita basis. We represent the RPS/CES standards currently
enacted/in place at the state level (Appendix A), adjusted
for the share of electricity generation not covered by the
policy. This last group includes an RPS in Virginia enacted
in 2020. Economy-wide targets for Connecticut, Maryland,
Hawaii, Minnesota, Vermont, Nevada and Virginia were
not included because they were either non-binding or they
required additional legislation to ensure the targets are
met. (To the extent that these states adopt implementing
legislation in the next few years, costs attributable to a
Section 115 program could be lower than estimated here,
depending on how the state measures are integrated with
the federal policy.)
These policy measures included in the baseline remain
in place through the policy scenarios. Compared to the
AEO Reference, our Baseline U.S. emissions are lower by
1.5% in 2025 and 3.1% in 2030 under the Mid-Range cost
assumption.
The Low-Cost Baseline includes adjustments discussed
above and adopts NREL’s 2019 ATB “Low” cost technology
assumptions. (These are very similar to the newer 2020 ATB
Mid-Range assumptions.) It assumes electric vehicle (EV)
cost parity with internal combustion vehicles after 2025,
consistent with other recent projections such as those by
the ICCT (Lutsey and Nicholas, 2019) and Bloomberg
New Energy Finance (2020). More ambitiously, it assumes
all states/regions achieve a 3% annual energy efficiency
improvement going forward, similar to the rate California
has achieved in recent decades. That state has pursued
energy efficiency policies more actively than others, so
this assumption implies that other states or the federal
government will adopt measures that encourage efficiency
through new incentives, or that enforce efficiency through
building codes or other regulations. The compounding effect
of an increased rate of energy efficiency improvement has
strong effects such that, compared to the AEO Reference
with ATB Mid-Range costs, U.S. emissions are lower by
7.0% in 2025 and 14.9% in 2030 in the Low-Cost Baseline.
In general, this baseline offers one sense of how declining
technology costs and ambitious complementary policies
can reduce emissions in the baseline.
2.3 Net Benefits Methodology
We estimate national net benefits in 2030 under Section
115 policies relative to the Mid-Range and Low-Cost Baselines. Net benefits are calculated as the sum of climate and
particulate matter pollution health benefits less the direct
7
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welfare costs of mitigation. Climate benefits are estimated
using a social cost of carbon of $59.50 per metric ton from
the IWG (2016) reflecting a 3% discount rate. The $59.50 is
the estimated social cost of carbon in 2030, inflated to 2018
dollars to make it comparable with welfare cost reporting.4
Health benefits reflect reduced premature mortality from
exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and are estimated
as follows. First, for each policy scenario, future emissions
levels of primary PM2.5, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
ammonia, and volatile organic compounds are projected by
scaling detailed National Emissions Inventory (NEI) data
(EPA, 2020) based on regional USREP-ReEDS outcomes; a
more detailed description of this approach is documented
in Dimanchev et al. (2019). 5 Next, concentrations of final PM2.5 are estimated using InMAP, a reduced-form air
quality model that simulates atmospheric chemistry and
transport of pollutants (Tessum et al., 2017); concentrations are interpolated to the county level for consistency
with population and incidence data in the following step.
Next, with county level population and mortality incidence
rates,6 we apply two concentration response functions reflecting associations between changes in exposure of PM2.5
and premature mortality found in the literature: a “high”
association (Lepeule et al., 2012) and “low” association
(Krewski et al., 2009), yielding high and low net benefits;
the former association is approximately 2.26 times higher
than the latter. Lastly, health benefits are monetized using
EPA’s value of a statistical life (i.e. reduction in mortality
risk) of $10.4 million in 2018 dollars for 2030, extrapolating the value from that reported for 2028 (EPA, 2018)
by an estimate of per capita income growth between 2028
and 2030, times the reduced number of mortalities. The
air pollution health benefits are only estimated for the
continental U.S.

3. Implementation of Emissions
Control Under Section 115
Based on past EPA program designs, we assume for this
illustrative analysis that the EPA would issue a model rule
that provides for state cap-and-trade programs with trading
among states, and that all states would choose to adopt
the model rule, resulting in a national trading program

(although states would retain the flexibility to pursue alternate approaches, the ease of implementation and cost
effectiveness of this approach is likely to be appealing).
Each state’s share of the required emissions reductions is
translated into the corresponding quantity of emissions
allowances that would be allocated to the state under a
trading program.
In exploring the distributional consequences of the policy,
we assume each state would distribute the allowance revenue
to its residents on a per capita basis.7 We assume a national
market for allowances, so there will in all cases be a single
national allowance price. We maintain revenue neutrality
through increases in the personal income tax rate.8
We follow the Supreme Court ruling in EPA vs. EME Homer
City as guidance for possible allocations among states.9
Three possible approaches for distributing allowances
among states include:

•

•

Equal Marginal Cost (EMC). This approach aims to
equalize the cost per ton of reduction in each state, even
in the absence of allowance trading among states. The
allocation is determined so that, if each state were to
auction its allowances only within the state, the auction price would be identical across states, creating no
opportunities for allowance arbitrage across regions.
While it is possible to achieve this result exactly in the
model simulation, an actual allocation would only approximate this outcome.
Equal Cut from Base Year Emissions (ECB). Allowances
are allocated to each state so that, if there were no trading,
the response in each state would be an equal percentage
(i.e., proportional) cut in emissions from its 2005 level.
If the national target is a 50% cut in emissions from

7
While some states may choose to return all allowances on a per
capita basis, others might use some portion of the funds to promote energy efficiency and clean energy, support trade-vulnerable
industries, invest in disadvantaged communities, or other goals. For a
summary of revenue use in carbon tax proposals see Hafstead (2020).

5
The underlying emissions are from NEI 2014, scaled to aggregate NEI 2017 levels to better capture recent and important emissions trends.

8
Revenue neutrality assures that total tax collections and outlays,
and the federal deficit, are unchanged as each policy scenario is compared with a baseline scenario. An increase in the deficit would create
spending that was not balanced by tax collection, producing an apparent welfare windfall, failing to account for the potential deficit increase
and its impact on future spending and/or taxes. Often the assumption
is that carbon allowance revenue is retained to ensure neutrality, but
under Section 115, states, not the federal government, would likely
retain the revenue. Real-world revenue impacts of a Section 115 policy
are challenging to predict and would depend upon shifts in markets
and trade, induced innovation, and other factors.

6
County level population and all-cause mortality incidence rates
are from EPA’s COBRA model for the year 2025 (EPA, 2018a). Population is scaled to 2030 at the state level using state level projections
using UVA (2018) (consistent with USREP welfare results); incidence
is scaled to 2030 at the county level using all-cause incidence projections in EPA’s BenMAP model (EPA, 2018b).

9
“Should the Agency allocate reductions proportionally (10 ppb
each), on a per capita basis, on the basis of the cost of abatement, or
by some other metric? The Good Neighbor Provision does not answer
that question for EPA. ...Under Chevron, we read Congress’ silence
as a delegation of authority to EPA to select from among reasonable
options.”(EPA vs. EME Homer City 2014)

4
The most recent estimate is $62 but the difference is due to
accounting in 2020 dollars. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/regulatory-matters/#scghgs
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•

the 2005 emissions, then every state would be given
allowances equal to 50% of its 2005 emissions.

Equal Per Capita (EPC). Allowances are allocated to
states based on population. If a state has 10% of the
2015 US population, it gets 10% of the allowances. As a
result, equal per-capita revenue is realized by each state.
The choice of allocation method influences the distribution of burdens among states, as illustrated below. Under
the EMC allocation, states with less expensive abatement
options will receive relatively fewer allowances than states
with more expensive ones. In the ECB approach, a state
with high emissions per capita in 2005 would receive more
allowances per capita than a state with lower emissions.
The choice leads to different amounts of per capita revenue
across states, and hence has varying effects on households
across the country. The EPC allocation would ensure that
if all states rebated revenue equally to all residents, the
rebate would be equal across the country (another view
of a fair allocation of revenue across states).

4. Analysis Results
4.1 Emissions prices and state reduction
levels
By assumption, we specify the same intermediate target in
2025 in both the 45% and 50% reduction targets, resulting
in identical national allowance prices in both scenarios
of $14 (Table 4). The prices diverge in 2030. There are
small differences in the allowance price across allocation
approaches due to the income effect, but the differences
are less than $1/MTCO2. The Low-Cost Baseline allowance
prices are one-half the Mid-Range 2025 levels, and are
about one-third the 2030 prices. In the remaining sections
of the main text, we focus on the Mid-Range Baseline.
Figures and tables for the Low-Cost Baseline are reported
in Appendix B.
Figure 3 shows the emissions reductions below 2005 levels,
by state, for the two emissions targets. First considering the
45% target (light blue bars), the reductions in emissions

Table 4. Emission Price ($ 2018)

Baseline
Mid-Range
Low-Cost

% Reduction

Allowance Price ($/MTCO2)
2025

2030

45%

$14

$68

50%

$14

$99

45%

$7

$20

50%

$7

$35

Figure 3. Percent Reduction in 2030 from 2005 Emissions, by State and Region.
Percent reduction in CO2 emissions from a 2005 base year (EMC allocation). Pink crossbars show emissions reductions in the Mid
Range Baseline.
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vary widely among states, with West Virginia (WV} showing the greatest reduction (80%) and Texas (TX) the least
(24%). Projected 2030 emissions of the states and regions
are indicated by pink crossbars in the figure, and almost
all are well below their 2005 levels. Exceptions are Alaska
(AK) and Texas (TX) where projected 2030 emissions are
above 2005 levels, and Idaho-Wyoming (ID-WY) where
2030 emissions are about the same as the 2005 level.
The actual response to the carbon price (the amount of
light blue bar below the pink line) is generally more similar
across states, with some exceptions. States with significant
state level policy such as Colorado (CO) and New York
(NY) are already at or near the federal target. Also, the
detailed results for Montana (MT) shows that its abundant
wind resources are economically competitive and lead to
the state nearly achieving its federal requirement in the
baseline, requiring little more effort.
The further effort required to meet the 50% target (dark
blue bars) varies considerably among states. The national
level carbon price yields the greatest reductions in states
where there are low cost abatement options, such as, for
example, shifting away from coal power generation to gas
or renewables. WV and MT exhaust most of their low-cost
abatement options in the 45% case, and so abate very little
additionally in the 50% scenario. Other states such as Ken-

tucky (KY) Ohio (OH) Missouri (MO), and Alaska (AK)
pick up more abatement in the 50% scenario, reflecting
the location of the next set of least cost options.
Figure 4 shows the same information as Figure 3 but plots
the reductions from the Mid Range Baseline projection for
2030 rather than from the 2005 base year emissions. Shown
are both tons (bars) and percentage (red dots) for the 45%
reduction scenario (top panel) and the 50% reduction scenario (lower panel). The EMC allocation is used as an example;
state emissions across the three allocation approaches are
nearly identical, with only small differences due to income
effects of variation in allowance revenue among states.
In addition, Figure 4 shows abatement in each state coming
from the power, transportation, industry, commercial, and
residential sectors. Consistent with earlier analysis of potential
U.S. carbon prices (Barron et al. 2018), the electricity sector is
the source of the largest share (~77–81%) of the cost-effective
emissions reductions in 2030 in nearly all states.10 States with
significant energy-intensive and fossil energy production such
as TX, AK, and Arkansas-Louisiana-Mississippi (AR-LA-MS)
10 We note that reductions outside of the electricity sector will
become increasingly important after 2030. This analysis may also
under-estimate the availability of low-cost reductions in non-electricity
sectors due to calibration to historical relationships instead of directly
representing emerging low carbon technologies for those sectors.

Figure 4. Reduction in 2030 from Baseline Emissions, by State/Region and Sector.
Reductions by sector in 2030 relative to the Mid Range Baseline across states under the EMC allocation. Right-hand axis shows
percentage reduction relative to the baseline.
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show the greatest reduction in emissions from industry,
in part because fossil fuel industries (such as refineries)
shrink, lowering emissions from them. AK and MT have
very little or no reduction from the power sector relative to
the baseline. In AK, the power sector accounts for less than
10% of emissions, so even with a substantial reduction the
power sector does not contribute much to the state’s overall
reduction. As noted earlier, MT has shifted largely to wind
power in the baseline, so there are no additional power
sector reductions available. Similar to MT, in CA and the
RGGI member states—New England (NENGL) and New
Jersey (NJ)—the electric sector achieves a large share of
reductions in the baseline, leading non-electric sectors to
play a bigger role in the overall reduction.
4.2 Regional Economic Impacts
4.2.1 Welfare

The overall social costs and benefits are best captured by a
welfare metric. The USREP model provides a measure of
welfare at the state level, which is computed as state consumption, taking account of changes in leisure and reflecting
both compliance costs and revenue from allowance sales. It
endogenously calculates direct welfare effects of mitigation
policies, discussed in this section. However, these endogenous estimates do not include welfare improvements from
improved air quality or reduced climate impacts. (In Section
4.2.2 we report a net benefit calculation that includes a separate estimate of the health benefits of avoided particulate
matter air pollution and of avoided climate damages.)
At the national level, the impacts of the policy on welfare
are best described as modest, even before accounting for air
quality or climate benefits. Economic welfare continues to
grow at almost the baseline rate in all scenarios (Figure 5).
Achieving a 45% reduction in CO2 delays the economy reach-

ing its January 1, 2030 level of welfare by only 1.6 months,
to mid-February. Meeting a 50% target means that welfare
reaches the same level by mid-March (a 2.5 month delay).
The welfare effects differ among the states, and this effect
also differs depending on the choice of allocation method
(Figure 6). States with high emissions in 2005 relative to
population such as WV are favored under the ECB. The
greatest reduction in welfare growth occurs in the state
most heavily dependent on energy production, Alaska
(AK). West Virginia (WV) has a noticeable gain in welfare
under the ECB allocation due to the significant number
of allowances it would receive.
4.2.2 Net Benefits

Table 5 provides national net benefits in 2030 under Section 115 policies relative to the Mid-Range and Low-Cost
Baselines. Specifically, they are estimated for 45% and 50%
reduction policies under the ECB allocation, as the emissions
outcomes vary only a small amount under the different
allowance allocation approaches. Net benefits are positive
and significant in each scenario, ranging from $72 billion
(Low-Cost 45% Reduction; Low Reduced Mortality) to $156
billion (Mid-Range 50% Reduction; High Reduced Mortality). For the same scenarios, reduced mortality ranges
from 3,544 to 14,356 in 2030. Health and climate benefits
are greater in the 50% Reduction than in the 45% Reduction scenarios, and also are greater under the Mid-Range
assumptions than under the Low-Cost Baseline, because the
Low-Cost Baseline has lower pollution emissions than the
Mid-Range Baseline. Health benefits exceed climate benefits
with the High estimate but are less than climate benefits with
the Low estimates, and health benefits alone offset negative
welfare impacts except under the Mid-Range assumptions
with the lower Reduced Mortality benefit estimate.

Figure 5. Welfare Growth Over Time.
Projections of baseline growth in economic welfare compared to welfare growth under the 45% and 50% reduction cases (EMC
allocation). Welfare estimate does not include health or climate benefits in the policy cases.
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Figure 6. Percent Change in Welfare Growth Rate under EPC, EMC and ECB Allocations.
Compound annual growth rate in welfare 2020-2030 in the Mid Range Baseline (red circles) compared to growth rate in the 45%
reduction case under the three allocation methods. Welfare growth does not include health or climate benefits in the policy cases.
Table 5. Net Benefits under Section 115 Policies Relative to Baselines in 2030 (2018$ billion). Note: Air pollution health benefits are
only estimated for the continental U.S.

Mid Range
US Net Benefits in 2030 (High)
Reduced Adult Mortality from PM2.5 [High]

Low Cost

45% (ECB)

50% (ECB)

45% (ECB)

50% (ECB)

11,852

14,356

8,027

10,834

Climate and Health Benefits [2018$ Bil]

205

248

133

179

Health Benefits

123

149

83

112

Climate Benefits

82

100

50

67

Ratio of Health: Climate Benefits

1.49

1.49

1.68

1.68

Change in Welfare [2018$ Bil]

-60

-92

-15

-29

Total Net Benefits [2018$ Bil]

145

156

118

150

5,230

6,334

3,544

4,782

137

165

86

116

US Net Benefits in 2030 (Low)
Reduced Adult Mortality from PM2.5 [Low]
Climate and Health Benefits [2018$ Bil]
Health Benefits

54

66

37

50

Climate Benefits

82

100

50

67

Ratio of Health: Climate Benefits

0.66

0.66

0.74

0.74

Change in Welfare [2018$ Bil]

-60

-92

-15

-29

Total Net Benefits [2018$ Bil]

76

73

72

88
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We compare air pollution and climate benefits under the ECB
allocation (benefits are nearly identical for all allocations) to
the EMC welfare effects for states (Figure 7). Welfare effects
at the national level are nearly identical for all allocations
but vary by state because of varying allowance revenue.
Climate benefits are allocated on an equal per capita basis
across states.11 We focus on the EMC allocation for welfare
effects because it was the approach taken by the EPA in the
Clean Power Plan proposed under the Obama Administration. All states show net benefits for the 45% reduction
except Idaho-Wyoming (ID-WY) where benefits just offset
welfare costs. Many states show net benefits just considering
the value of avoided mortality from particulate matter. As
seen earlier, much of the carbon emissions reduction comes
from eliminating coal power generation, and so larger air
pollution benefits accrue to states that rely on or are near
states with coal power plants in the Baseline. These are states
in the middle of the U.S. that have higher pollution levels in
the Baseline because of reliance on coal power generation,
achieving annual net benefits in the range of $400 to $800
per capita. Western, Mountain, and Northeastern states have
11 Climate benefits will be unrelated to CO2 emissions reductions in
the state because emissions anywhere affect the global climate. Using
the social cost of carbon to value climate benefits does not currently
provide a basis to differentially allocate benefits to states, although climate benefits will vary geographically within the U.S. The Social Cost
of Carbon also includes benefits accruing outside the U.S.; the nuances
of how to consider these benefits and associated issues of reciprocity
are beyond the scope of this analysis. The interagency working group
that developed the U.S. estimate of the social cost of carbon used
here also emphasizes the importance of using a range of values when
considering the social cost of greenhouse gases - only one value is
presented here due to graphical constraints.

lower pollution levels in the Baseline or more emissions
outside the power sector and see lower air pollution benefits,
with net benefits of $0 to $200 per capita.
4.2.3 State/Regional Revenue

The sale of allowances to emitting entities who need them
could be conducted by the states themselves, which would
then directly receive the revenue. With a uniform national
allowance price, the allocation method determines the
distribution of funds among the states within the simulated
results (Figure B1).12 The allowance value per capita--the
amount states would distribute to each resident if they
chose a simple lump sum allocation of revenue--is shown
in Figure 8. The EPC allocation results in identical per
capita allowance revenue in all states—an estimated $669
for the 45% reduction. In the ECB the range is from $356
to $2,403, with California (CA) the lowest and Alaska
(AK) the highest. Under the EMC allocation, the range
is $424 to $3,046 with New York (NY) the lowest and AK
the highest. AK has by far the highest emissions per capita, and so both the ECB and EMC allocation methods
are favored over equal per capita allocation. In general,
emissions intensive states are favored by the ECB and EMC
allocations. West Virginia (WV) and Montana (MT) are
especially favored under the ECB allocation because by
2030 their emissions in the baseline have already fallen
substantially (and they were emissions intensive in 2005).
The total allowance value (i.e., state revenues) accruing to
each state is reported in Appendix C.
12 Prices in actual allowance markets vary over the course of a year.
States may auction allowances at different times, leading to differences
in the average price at which allowances are auctioned among states.

Figure 7. Per capita net benefits by state in 2030 for the 45% reduction, EMC allocation, relative to the Mid Range Baseline.
Air pollution benefits and welfare impacts are those estimated to accrue in the state. Climate benefits are assigned on an equal per
capita basis across states.
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Figure 8. State Revenue Per Capita in 2030 from Allowance Sale, 45% Reduction.
Results are sorted by size of per-capita rebate under equal marginal cost (EMC) allocation.

4.2.4 Distributional Effects

An important concern of policymakers is to avoid regressive
policy measures, where costs fall more heavily on lower
income households. While the price increases resulting from
requiring emitters to hold allowances have the potential to
be regressive because low income households spend a larger
share of their income on energy, the allowance revenue
provides a means to offset these regressive effects.13 Per
capita rebates generally have the effect of making carbon
pricing policies progressive, with net improvements in welfare to the lowest income households relative to baseline
projections (Caron et al., 2018a,b). The welfare effects by
income level we report in this section do not include air
pollution or climate benefits. Some studies (Hajat et al.,
2015) have found health impacts from poor air quality
tend to fall on lower-income households in the U.S., which
13 Equal lump sum distribution of allowance revenue tends to be
progressive because even though lower income households spend a
larger share of their income on energy, their absolute level of expenditure is much less than wealthier households. In addition, our background assumption of holding total tax revenue unchanged (in real
terms) maintains federal expenditures, including transfer payments,
constant, essentially indexing transfer payments for any price changes.
Such indexing of transfer payments also contributes to policy progressivity (Cronin et al., 2017; Goulder et al., 2018), although only for
those who receive significant transfer payments (i.e., not necessarily
the working poor).

14

means a Section 115 policy could produce further welfare
improvements for those households. This will depend on
what sources of pollution are reduced, and further analysis is needed to determine if the abated pollution sources
disproportionately contribute to the health problems of
lower income households.
In our analysis, shown in Figure 9, the per capita rebates
lead to modest welfare improvements for the lowest income
quintile (relative to the baseline) in all fifty states under
a 45% reduction. The second income quintile also sees
welfare improvements in regions representing 19–33 states
with 36–51% of the U.S. population, depending upon the
allocation approach.14 The largest reductions in welfare
growth are generally in the highest income quintile, with
the impact still usually less than 1%. At the national level,
this translates to a delay of 1.3 to 9.6 months in reaching
the baseline welfare level of 2030 for the highest income
quintile, depending upon the region and allocation approach. Across states and regions there is, as expected,
variability in the patterns of the distributional impacts.
14 Under the 50% reduction, depending on the allocation method
the lowest income quintile sees welfare improvements in 49 to 50
states containing 94 to 100% of the US population. Welfare in the
second income quintile improves in 19 to 27 states with 31 to 46% of
the U.S. population.
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Figure 9. Distributional Impact by Income Quintile, 45% Reduction by EMC, ECB, EPC Allocations.
State welfare impacts, stated as a change in compound annual growth, by national income quintile under each allocation method.
Does not include air pollution or climate benefits.
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5. Discussion
This analysis explores the effects of a carbon allowance
program in the U.S. as it might be implemented under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act. As with similar other
CAA programs, EPA would lay out goals and guidelines,
but would leave the implementation details to be decided
by the states. Economic efficiency would be best achieved
through a trading program with broad scope, but a state
could choose other policies, such as command and control
measures, to meet its target if they better met individual
circumstances and policy goals.15 Section 115 is well-suited
to establishing a trading program with broad scope, but
the analysis presented here could be generally applicable
to the establishment of a trading program under other
authorities. Details of implementation, under Section 115
or other authority, could obviously lead to different results
and, as illustrated by the Low-Cost Baseline, future technology costs and energy efficiency gains could significantly
affect results. Varying the national targets, the allocation of
emission reduction responsibilities among states, or what
states do with the allowance revenue would affect costs and
relative impacts among states and the distributional consequences within states. For example, the assumption applied
here, equal per capita lump sum distribution of allowance
revenue, is progressive. In contrast, free distribution of
allowances to polluters tends to be regressive because the
allowances go largely to corporations, leading to windfall
profits that ultimately are distributed to shareholders, who
are mostly upper income households.
Because Section 115 would be implemented through a
SIP process, the costs, benefits and impacts attributable to
the program would also depend on the emissions policies
already in place in a state when the program goes into
effect. For example, our analysis shows that states such as
Colorado, New York and California, which already have
ambitious economy-wide programs, would need to achieve
few, if any, additional reductions to comply with the program
(Figure 3). Technology advances, such as falling solar cost,
as assumed in the Low-Cost Baseline, might enable other
states such as Arizona and New Mexico to meet their goals
with little additional effort as well, as shown in Appendix
B. Broad federal measures such as efficiency standards,
more ambitious vehicle emissions standards, public health
regulations, tax incentives, and direct federal investment
(including post-COVID stimulus) will also further reduce
baseline emissions and the need for states to adopt additional measures. Such additional federal measures would
lower costs of the Section 115 program, and perhaps bring
results closer to those in the Low-Cost Baseline.
15 For example, some states such as California and New York have
increasingly focused on ways to combine market measures with tools
to address environmental injustice.
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Though the bulk of the reductions (77% to 81%) are found
to come from the electricity sector, the mix of reductions
highlights advantages of this economy-wide approach. First,
the substantial fraction of reductions that come from outside
the electricity sector suggests that there are cost-effective
reductions that can be achieved there, which may be more
difficult to achieve through sector-specific policies. We also
note that, while our coupled model represents the electricity
sector in great detail, there is much less detail for the other
sectors. It is possible that a more complete representation of
existing and emerging technologies in non-electric sectors
could reveal additional cost-effective reductions. Second,
a consistent price signal across the overall economy can
help avoid leakage across sectors that might slow decarbonization (e.g., higher electricity prices with no pressure on
natural gas use outside the electric sector would discourage
electrification). Finally, establishing a program with broad
scope now will spur continued emissions reductions after
the electricity sector has largely been decarbonized, which
will be essential to further reductions post-2030.
Our results suggest that, using Section 115, the cost of
cutting GHG emissions to 45% to 50% below 2005 levels by
2030 is very modest. This result is due in part to ambitious
existing state policies, falling renewable energy costs, and
low natural gas prices. Considering health benefits using
estimates of particulate matter air pollution health benefits
and climate benefits using the social costs of carbon, less the
mitigation costs, we find net benefits to the US in all cases,
with slightly larger net benefits with the 50% reduction.
The EPA’s Science Advisory Board has recommended that
economy-wide models should work to incorporate the
economy-wide ripple effects of health benefits in analysis of
air and climate policies (SAB, 2017). Our calculation of air
pollution and climate benefits are exogenous calculations
using a more conventional approach valuing mortality at
the value of a statistical life and climate benefits using the
social cost of carbon. Bringing at least some of the health
benefits inside the CGE framework remains an important
area for future analysts.
The analysis also shows how regional disparities in the welfare
cost can be moderated somewhat by the allocation of allowances among states. There is a strong correlation in emissions,
costs of reduction, and population among states, so the differences resulting from different allocation procedures are
relatively small for most states. Still, allocation by marginal
cost (EMC) or reduction from base year (ECB) appear better
than per-capita (EPC) at reducing the negative outliers in state
cost impacts. While we focused on three basic approaches for
illustrative purposes, EPA could formulate other approaches, including combinations of these three, to further reduce
disparities across states and regions.
Consistent with earlier studies on carbon pricing policies
(Caron, 2018b; Rosenberg et al., 2018; Metcalf, 2019), our
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results show that equal lump sum payments to state residents
generally lead to net benefits to lower income households
across the majority of the population. While states may
choose other policy approaches or other uses of the revenue from allowance sales, maintaining a significant per
capita or targeted low-income rebate will keep the policy
progressive with respect to income.
While we have focused on the balancing of emissions reductions and costs across states, it is important to recognize
that EPA and the states face other design considerations
not discussed here. For example, States may wish to modify
allowance allocation or other aspects of their SIPs to protect
energy intensive industry from international trade exposure
(Dotson, 2020). Similarly, while a trading system can help
ensure economically efficient outcomes, and per-capita
rebates improve welfare for lower income households, states
and EPA may want to do even more to address existing
disparities in exposure to air pollution. For example, EPA
may wish to require states to take steps to ensure that their
SIP processes engage environmental justice communities
in a meaningful way and that the states consider policies
to ensure that trading mechanisms do not exacerbate (and
ideally reduce) existing disparities.

6. References

Section 115 clearly offers significant potential to achieve
GHG reductions. Unfortunately, the lack of case law, or
consideration of this application by the federal courts,
suggest there is also legal risk. The legislative history of the
Act indicates that climate concerns were on policymakers’
radar when the provision was enacted (Barnett, 2020), but
others suggest that courts may be skeptical of drawing such
expansive authority from a brief and heretofore rarely used
part of the Act (Richardson, 2017). Ultimately, any legal
risk must be weighed against the environmental benefits
and other policy advantages, which can be more fully assessed with further analyses like the one we present here.
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Appendix A: Emissions Control Measures in the AEO Reference and Baseline
Measures to Promote Low-Carbon Electricity
Generation
Figure A1 shows the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
imposed by states in ReEDS. The policy stringency in the
AEO Reference and Mid Range Baseline is represented
by a solid bar and a shaded bar, respectively. A red shade
represents a less stringent policy measure in the Baseline relative to the AEO Reference, whereas a blue shade
represents a Baseline policy stringency no less than that
in the AEO Reference. A green shade marks the policy
stringency in a state where no policy exists in the AEO
Reference. A significant number of these adjustments are
to reflect the fact that state RPS policies often only cover
investor-owned utilities, exempting rural electric cooperatives and municipal utilities and effectively reducing the
stringency of the program.

some states (Figure A2). The comparison is drawn with
the same color and pattern convention as in Figure A1.

Similar to RPS, the policy stringency of Clean Energy
Standards (CES), and wind and solar carveouts differ in

* The Agriculture and Other sectors are exempted from AB32
cap. For technical reasons the emissions cap is achieved in
the model using a tax instrument.

Other State Emissions Abatement Policies
In three states emissions control measures are considered
that extend beyond the electric sector.
Table A1. Economy-Wide State Control Measures

State Coverage

Unit

2020 2025 2030
156

NY

Economy-Wide
Cap

MMTCO2e

CO

Economy-Wide
Cap

CA

Economy-Wide
Cap*

140

122

Percent
below 2005

26%

50%

2018$/tCO2

$65

$83

Figure A1. Renewable Portfolio Standards by state
The AEO reference is compared with the Mid Range Baseline
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Figure A2. Clean Energy Standards and wind and solar carveouts by state
The AEO reference is compared with the Mid Range Baseline.

Appendix B: Low-Cost Baseline Results
Projections of future costs of policies are uncertain, with
baseline projections of key technologies like wind and solar
often failing to keep pace with falling prices. While a full
sensitivity analysis is beyond the scope of this study, we
explore how the impacts of a program under Section 115
would change if technology costs were lower than projected
and states (perhaps with Federal support) invested more
in energy efficiency.
To account for the possibility of more rapid declines in
renewable energy costs, parts of the analysis were repeated with NREL’s “Low” rather than mid-cost assumptions
(NREL, 2019). See Figures B1, B2, B3 and B4.
To account for the possible breakthrough in the battery
technology in electric vehicles, we ran the model with
electric vehicles achieving cost parity with conventional
internal combustion engine vehicles by 2030.16 Noting
that energy efficiency has been a key component of the
strategies of many leading states, this scenario also includes
16 This assumption is not particularly aggressive; both the International Council on Clean Transportation and Bloomberg New Energy
Finance project cost parity well before this point.
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the assumption of significant additional investment in
energy efficiency. To approximate this effect, we assume
that each state accomplishes a rate of endogenous energy
efficiency improvement that matches the historical rate
in California over the period 1999-2008. This rate could
be achieved through a combination of tightened federal
efficiency standards, federal investment (perhaps as part
of a COVID-19 recovery package), and state level actions
(either with allowance revenue or revenue from other
funding sources).
In general, the Low-Cost Baseline results in a similar pattern
of emissions reductions, with roughly 78% of reductions
in 2030 coming from the electricity sector, and similar
patterns regarding where costs occur across regions. As
expected, overall and regional welfare costs are even smaller
under this scenario.
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Figure B1. Reduction in 2030 from Low-cost Baseline Emissions, by State and Region, Low Cost Baseline.
Reductions by sector in 2030 relative to the Low-Cost Baseline across states under EMC allocation. Second axis shows percentage
reduction.

Figure B2. Percent Reduction in 2030 from 2005 Emissions, by State and Region, Low Cost Baseline.
Percent reduction in CO2 emissions from a 2005 base year (EMC allocation) under the Low-Cost Baseline. Orange crossbars show
projections of the reduction in emissions in the Mid-Range Baseline. Yellow bars show projections of emissions under the Low-Cost
Baseline. Results are similar to the Mid Range Baseline with some exceptions. For example, the need to reduce less nationwide
because emissions in the Low-Cost Baseline are lower, creates room for Alaska emissions to be higher than their 2005 level (but
still reduced from the 2030 Baseline). Also, NC-SC emissions are higher in 2030 in the Low-Cost Baseline than in the Mid Range
Baseline. Higher emissions result because some coal power plants remain to balance greater penetration of intermittent renewables.
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Figure B3. Welfare Growth Over Time, Low Cost Baseline.
Low Cost Baseline projections of growth in economic welfare compared to welfare growth under the 45% and 50% reduction cases
(EMC allocation). Welfare estimate does not include health or climate benefits.

Figure B4. Distributional Impact by Income Quintile, 45% Reduction by EMC, ECB, EPC, Low Cost Baseline.
State welfare impacts, stated as a percentage change, by national income quintile under each allocation method.
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Appendix C: Revenue from Allowance Sale by Allocation
Figures C1 and C2 show state revenues under Mid Cost
and Low Cost Baselines. Since population, energy use,
and emissions are highly correlated, large states generate
higher allowance revenue in all three of our allocation
rules. States with lower emissions per capita generally have
greater allowance revenue under the EPC allocation. Note
that California (CA) as the most populous states generates the highest allowance revenue under this allocation
approach, but falls to 2nd and 3rd under the EMC and ECB
approaches because many opportunities to abate emissions have already been exploited under state initiatives,

and base year emissions (per capita) were already much
lower than, for example, Texas (TX). And, for example,
West Virginia (WV) generates much more revenue under
the ECB approach because it had relied so heavily on coal
power generation but had reduced reliance on coal by
2030 in either Baseline, and could switch further to other
power sources at relatively low cost in the policy scenarios.
The main difference between the two Baselines is total
allowance value is much lower in the Low-Cost Baseline
because allowance prices are much lower.

Figure C1. State Revenue in 2030 from Allowance Sale, EPC, EMC and ECB Allocations under Mid-Range Baseline Assumptions.
Differences in revenue among states largely reflect the size of the state in terms of abatement potential, base year emissions or population.
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Figure C2. State Revenue in 2030 from Allowance Sale, EPC, EMC and ECB Allocations under Low-Cost Baseline Assumptions.
Revenue to states under the Low-Cost Baseline are about one-third that in the Mid-Range Baseline, reflecting the lower allowance
price.
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